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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks beyond the sensationalized coverage of Islamic State and instead 
utilizes Islamic State materials as a window into the remote radicalization and 
recruitment process of susceptible English-speaking individuals in the West. This thesis 
considers Islamic State’s mode of operation in conjunction with the appeals made in its 
online materials to devise a framework for understanding how Islamic State materials 
interact with susceptible individuals. The framework lends insight into how the body 
tasked with creating counter-narratives within the U.S. State Department can more 
effectively disrupt the remote recruitment and radicalization process.  
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The Rise of Islamic State: Gauging the Threat 
 In 2014, Islamic State made a dramatic debut on United States’ radar. Although 
Islamic State has existed in some form since 2004, its moves to take large swaths of 
territory in Iraq and Syria a decade later, and its style of doing so earned it international 
attention. This attention turned to serious concern when Islamic State was linked to 
multiple large-scale terrorist attacks in France and the United States in 2015 and 2016. 
Consequently, dealing with Islamic State moved to the top of the U.S. priority list. When 
addressing the issue, both of the 2016 Presidential candidates purported to have strategies 
that would “destroy” Islamic State. Although Islamic State’s regional grip is on the 
decline, opposition forces have by no means destroyed it. Contrary to American political 
rhetoric, even a full-blown military defeat will not eliminate the threat posed by Islamic 
State. Its members may disperse, its name may change, and its power may decentralize, 
but the underlying forces that draw individuals to groups like Islamic State and enable it 
to succeed will remain. To fully address the threat of Islamic State, it is necessary to 
understand those underlying forces. In looking at Islamic State’s mode of operation in 
this chapter, I explore the group’s defining principles in order to contribute to a broad 
understanding of what makes individuals join IS and act on its behalf. 
Modus Operandi 
The first step in outlining Islamic State operations requires identifying the group’s 
explicit goals. The central aim of Islamic State is made evident largely by its name. First 
and foremost, IS aims to establish an Islamic Caliphate that functions under a Caliph and 
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in accordance with its version of Sharia law. In doing so, the group seeks to unite the 
Muslim people, the Ummah, under the “true” form of Islam. 
Islamic State derives its conception of “true” Islam from several key sources. The 
first is 14th Century Islamic thinker, Ibn Taymiyya. The group refers to Ibn Taymiyya as 
“The Great Sheikh,” and it often cites his writings within its own materials such as its 
monthly magazine, Dabiq.1 Ibn Taymiyya dealt harsh criticism to Sufis and Shia 
Muslims for bringing what he believed were Bad’ah, or innovations, to Islam which he 
claimed were a derision of true Islam.2 Among his most influential doctrines for IS was 
his Second Fatwa in which he declares the legality of killing Mongols, an invading force 
during his time.3 This Fatwa was the first of any to legalize the killing of Muslims and 
has been used and largely expanded by IS to justify its harsh treatment and killing of any 
Muslim groups, such as Shias and Sufis, that it claims have deviated from “true” Islam. 
The group has also used Taymiyya to justify its enslavement of Yazidi girls and women. 
For instance, in Issue 4 of Dabiq, Islamic State cites Ibn Taymiyya’s determination that 
enslavement is consistent with the practices of Muhammad and his companions.4 Even 
though Islamic State skews Taymiyya’s teachings, the fact remains that Ibn Taymiyya 
plays a prominent authority figure in defining the group’s ideological platform. 
The group also formulates its conception of Islam from what Professor Ahmad 
Moussali refers to as neo-Wahhabism. Wahhabism, as part of a broader Salafist 
movement, formed with the purpose of returning Muslims “to the pure Islam of the 
                                                
1 Khwaja Khusro Tariq, “Lessons From Islamic History: Ibn Taymiyyah and the Synthesis of Takfir,” 
Huffington Post, May 31, 2016. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Hoover, Jon, “Jihad and the Mongols,” Google Sites, 2016.  
4 “The Failed Crusade,” Dabiq: Issue 4, DATE, 15. 
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Qur’an and prophetic sunna.”5 At its founding, Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab—who 
was himself heavily influenced by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya—demanded that “pure” 
Islam requires eliminating the orthodox Sunni practice of using intermediaries in prayer 
(Tawassul).6  It also requires a literal reading of the Qur’an and prophetic sunna. Such a 
reading recognizes God as having anthropomorphic qualities and obligates all Muslims to 
partake in Jihad.7 Jihad can be interpreted as an “internal struggle for righteousness,” but 
extremist groups who derive their ideology from Wahhabism see jihad as a call for an 
offensive and universal fight against unbelievers.8 In the early 20th Century, Wahhabism 
shifted from “revolutionary jihad” to a “conservative” movement which worked to 
uphold the institution that kept the royal Saudi family in power.9 In its efforts to establish 
a Caliphate, Islamic State is calling for a return to the original Wahhabi doctrine. In fact, 
Cole Bunzel of Brookings Institute writes that “Some Islamic State official publications 
are little more than long quotations from Wahhabi scholars.”10  
In addition to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya and Wahhabi doctrine, Islamic State’s 
operations are crucially defined and inspired by the now deceased Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi. Despite early ideological rifts between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden, al-Qaeda 
enabled the Jordanian to found al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004.11 Although AQI remained 
only a terrorist organization and did not extend its efforts to the establishment of a state, 
                                                
5 Ahmad Moussalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?” American University of 
Beirut, January, 2009, 12. 
6 Ibid., 5.  
7 Ibid., 6-7. 
8 Daniel Byman,  “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, 2016, 136. 
9 Ahmad Moussalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?” American University of 
Beirut, January, 2009 7. 
10 Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on 
U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, March 2015, 10. 
11 Daniel Byman,  “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, 2016, 132. 
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al-Zarqawi’s ideological motivations gave rise to the defining principles of Islamic State. 
Until his death in 2006, al-Zarqawi and AQI fought viciously against the occupying force 
of the United States, carrying out suicide bombings and beheadings. However, al-
Zarqawi’s primary focus was directed toward what he called the “apostate” Arab regimes 
and, most importantly, the Shi’ites.12 In a letter to bin Ladin in 2004, Zarqawi wrote that 
the Shi’ites are “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious 
scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.”13 Even though al-Zarqawi did 
not make direct moves to establish a Caliphate, his use of sectarian violence with AQI 
could be seen as the initial steps toward its inception. Charles Lister of the Brookings 
Institute purports, “Zarqawi believed his organization could take advantage of the 
resulting chaos to cast itself as the defender of the Sunni community and to usher in the 
establishment of an Islamic state.”14 This fixation on eliminating regional opposition, 
particularly the Shia, is reflected in Islamic State’s prioritization of its operations. The 
group has become notorious for its brutal treatment of Shi’ites and other minority groups 
in all of the places it operates. It also incites violent treatment of these groups in 
neighboring areas, including Saudi Arabia and Yemen in an attempt to “exploit a 
sectarian dynamic in these countries to attract followers.”15  
Notably, and in contrast with al-Qaeda, Islamic State does not see fighting the 
West as its number one objective. In a study comparing messaging materials of al-Qaeda, 
Celine Marie I. Novenario writes, “For Al Qaeda, the task at hand is attacking the far 
                                                
12 Tomas Kavalek, “From al-Qaeda in Iraq to Islamic State: The Story of Insurgency in Iraq and Syria in 
2003-2015,” Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2015, 9. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Charles Lister, Islamic State: A Brief Introduction, Brookings Institution Press, 2015, 8. 
15 Byman, Daniel, “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 
(Spring 2016) pp. 127-165, 138. 
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enemy; building a Caliphate would come later. Islamic State, however, believes that the 
Caliphate is here; the end-of-days encounter with the far enemy comes next.”16 
Consequently, IS spends most of its resources and focuses its strategy on the fight to 
protect and expand the Caliphate. This does not mean that the group neglects to pursue 
terrorist attacks on its neighboring enemies and enemies overseas. Since its inception, 
Islamic State has carried out numerous attacks across the world, including two large-
scale, coordinated attacks in France that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. It has 
also inspired rogue actors to act on its behalf. These attacks include shootings in San 
Bernardino and Florida, carried out by individuals who pledged allegiance to ISIS. Below 
is a graphic created by The New York Times documenting all attacks inspired or 
coordinated by Islamic State from the group’s inception to March of 2016.17 
 
                                                
16 Novenario, Celine Marie I, “Differentiating Al Qaeda and Islamic State Through Strategies Publicized in 
Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39:11, 953-967, March 15, 2016, 955. 
17 Yourish, Karen, Watkins, Derek, and Giratikanon, Tom, “Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks 
Around the World,” The New York Times, March 22, 2016. 
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Islamic State’s use of terrorism serves several purposes, including intimidating enemies 
both near and far, broadening sectarian rifts, attracting sympathizers to join the fight, and 
inspiring sympathizers to carry out similar acts around the world. In his 2015 paper, 
Byman writes, “Its use of terrorism, therefore, should be considered within this context: 
most, but not all, of what Islamic State does with regard to terrorism is an adjunct to its 
effort to advance its state power by fomenting sectarian conflict and intimidating 
rivals.”18 
However, bolstered opposition and recent military defeats in Islamic State’s 
territory could be forcing a shift in the group’s operations. Islamic State’s territorial hold 
is currently on the decline. Since the “peak” of Islamic State’s territorial control in 
August 2014, a July 2016 report by The New York Times states that the group has lost 
“about 45 percent of its territory in Syria and 20 percent in Iraq.”19 Evidence of a possible 
shift in operations exists in IS’ new magazine, Rumiyah, which the group started 
publishing in September 2016. The Clarion Project compares Rumiyah with Dabiq, 
calling it an “easier to read, less theological magazine,” which in its first two editions 
focuses more heavily on “operations outside the group’s heartland, including terrorist 
attacks carried out by the group in Kenya and elsewhere.20 Similarly, in a speech given by 
al-Adnani shortly before his death in May 2016, he encouraged IS sympathizers to carry 
out attacks in their home countries: “If the tyrants have closed in your faces the door of 
                                                
18Byman, Daniel, “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 
(Spring 2016) pp. 127-165, 13. 
19Sarah Almukhtar, Sarah Wallace, and Time Watkins, “ISIS Has Lost Many of the Key Places it Once 
Controlled,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016. 
20 Elliot Friedland, “Latest Issue of Rumiyah Magazine Released,” The Clarion Project, October 11, 2016. 
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hijrah [migration], then open in their face the door of jihad and make their act a source of 
pain for them,” and further, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is 
dearer to us than the largest action by us, and more effective and more damaging to 
them.”21 Continued losses in territorial control could necessitate a decentralization of IS, 
pushing it to function more as a terrorist group than an insurgency group. Even so, IS still 
explicitly maintains its principal goal of “baqiya wa tatamadad” (lasting and 
expanding).22 
With its main objective remaining the establishment and expansion a Caliphate, 
Islamic State depicts its project as the “fulfillment of a prophecy.”23 Among the prophetic 
sunna, Muhammad is recorded to have prophesied the coming of the Mahdi, a figure who 
would come and lead the Ummah in a fight to achieve an Islamic world peace before 
Judgment Day.24 Islamic State sees the creation of a Caliphate as a necessary step in 
achieving the Islamic world order prophesied by Muhammad in recorded Hadith. Islamic 
State’s “apocalyptic strand” is evidenced throughout materials released by the group.25 
For instance, in Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani’s June 2014 speech declaring an Islamic 
Caliphate, Islamic State’s spokesman cites Hadith to iterate the promise of the group’s 
mission: “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous 
deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He 
                                                
21 Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley, “Flow of foreign fighters plummets as Islamic 
State loses its edge,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2016. 
22Charles Lister, “Profiling Islamic State,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014, 11. 
23Byman, Daniel, “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 
(Spring 2016) pp. 127-165, 140. 
24 Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, “The Approach of the Armageddon? An Islamic Perspective,” 
Islamsupremecouncil.org, 2003. 
25 Byman, Daniel, “Understanding Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 
(Spring 2016) pp. 127-165, 137. 
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granted it to those before them” [An-Nūr: 55].26 In establishing a state that unites the 
Muslim people under “true” Islam, Islamic State professes that God will grant the group 
success and cause a return to an Islamic world order that harkens back to the days of 
Muhammad and his followers.  
This apocalypticism shows up in IS’ fight to gain control of Dabiq, the place 
where Muhammad said victory would be won over the Romans. Although the small town 
is not inherently tactically significant, the group has expended valuable resources and 
fighters in order to attain and hold onto it.  The group also applies the prophetic claims of 
Muhammad to its depiction of its adversaries. In Dabiq, IS frequently refers to the U.S. 
and other opposition forces as “Crusaders,” thus maintaining the prophetic language of 
Muhammad, who was at the time using “Crusaders” to refer to the Romans. In 
accordance with Hadith, the group professes that the Mahdi will come once the crusaders 
are defeated at Dabiq. 
Within the territory it holds, Islamic State has stayed true to its ambitions of 
establishing a Caliphate in which it imposes its version of Sharia law. Within this self-
declared caliphate, IS attempts to carry out the basic functions of a state. While Islamic 
State relies heavily on fear to suppress those it rules, it has also set up a system in which 
it attempts to gain the trust and loyalty of local populations in hopes of making long-term 
gains in its pursuit of an expanding Caliphate. In her exploration of Islamic State’s state 
operations, Mara Revkin of Foreign Affairs writes that the group has set out to operate as 
legitimate state institutions do―on the basis of a “social contract”; Islamic State provides 
                                                
26“ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as ‘Islamic State’,” Site Intel Group, June 29, 
2014. 
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services and protections while imposing “reciprocal obligations” on the people.27 Islamic 
State offers to provide what it deems “justice and accountability, protection, and 
services” to its ri’ya (the term the group uses to refer to the people living under its rule; 
its citizenry) if the people in turn pledge “exclusive allegiance” to the group and give 
“material support for governance and jihad through either tax payments or military 
service.”28  
Islamic State’s execution of its promised law and order is highly suspect. The 
“justice” IS purports to provide those living under its rule is often nothing more than the 
use of regular public executions to deter opposition. Islamic State kills any who challenge 
it; this includes individuals speaking or acting out against the group in any way as well as 
people of minority groups whose very existence Islamic State sees as effrontery. In 
March of 2016, collected findings led the United States to declare that Islamic State is 
guilty of genocide.29 Within areas it controls, IS has committed mass atrocities against 
Christians, Yazidis, and Shi’ites. It has also carried out brutal acts of violence against the 
Sunni population that it purports to support. Public executions, often by beheadings, are a 
daily occurrence. Islamic State has raided Yazidi settlements with the sole intention of 
taking women and girls to traffic and sell them to Islamic State members as sex slaves.30 
In areas taken from IS, government forces have discovered mass, unmarked graves where 
                                                
27 Mara Revkin, “ISIS Social Contract,” Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2016. 
28 Ibid. 
29 “U.S. Declares ISIS Guilty of Genocide,” CBS News, March 17, 2016. 
30 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” The New York Times, August 13, 2015. 
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men and boys were mowed down by gunfire.31 However, the group still paints itself as a 
legitimate state that operates on the basis of a social contract.  
On IS’ side of this purported contractual exchange, the group attempts to provide 
goods and services as well as to promote and conserve its version of Sharia law and 
Islamic practices. According to a 2014 report released by the Institute for the Study of 
War, Islamic State “divides governance into two broad categories: Administration and 
Muslim Services.”32 The Muslim Services branch operates with varying degrees of 
efficiency depending on IS’ level of control of particular cities. In Raqqa, for instance, 
the group created a body called the Department of Muslim Services which was designed 
to handle the distribution of goods and services a well as to carry out service projects, 
including “humanitarian aid, bakeries, water and electricity.”33 In Raqqa and elsewhere, 
much of IS’ Muslim Service regional bodies are stymied by IS’ own campaign against 
any and all opposition. The group frequently destroys pre-existing service-provision 
structures and fails to replace them due to a lack of resources and expertise.34 On the 
other side of its governance structure, the administration branch deals with “Islamic 
outreach, Sharia institutes, elementary education, law enforcement (both local and 
religious), courts, recruitment, and tribal relations.”35 Regarding IS’ use of taxation, the 
Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence stated, “Make no mistake: This 
is not taxation in return for services or even for real protection.  It is theft, pure and 
                                                
31 Arwa Damon and Raja Rezek, “CNN Exclusive: Syrian town left scarred by opposition group ISIS’ 
brutal rule,” February 17, 2014. 
32 Charles C. Carris and Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, July 
2014, 14. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 4. 
35 Ibid. 
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simple. The money ISIL pilfers is being exchanged not for a guarantee of safety but for 
the temporary absence of harm.”36 IS also shows signs of technical inexperience when it 
comes to distributing resources. For instance, the group’s attempt to use a dam within its 
territory resulted in dropping water levels in a nearby lake, “threatening drinking water 
supplies” for parts of Aleppo and Raqqa in 2014.37 In addition to inexperience, many of 
the projects undertaken by IS aim to provide material for its propaganda campaign to 
attract more members rather than to take into consideration the long-term impacts of its 
projects.38 Materials released by Islamic State depict its Caliphate as a successful, highly 
functioning entity with well-cared-for citizens, but the reality of life within the Caliphate 
is much more grim. A video purportedly released by the group in April 2016 shows 
images of everyday life in Raqqa: a group of students being directed by a teacher in a 
classroom, roadwork and construction projects, thriving marketplaces, police enforcing 
Sharia Law, etc.39 However, news reports depict a city rife with power outages, food 
shortages, brutality, and suppression.40 Even if Islamic State does not come close to 
reciprocating the payment of its people in its provision of services, the group is able to 
maintain the minimal level of local support necessary to survive simply because it is able 
offer more than the corrupt or inept alternative factions in the region. IS can simply strive 
to be the “lesser evil” amongst the other military forces jockeying for power.41  
                                                
36 “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at The Carnegie 
Endowment For International Peace, ‘Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation’,” treasury.gov, October 23, 
2014. 
37 Charles C. Carris and Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, July 
2014, 22. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 “Watch: New ISIS Video Attempts to Show Functioning Society in ‘Capital’ Raqqa, Syria,” Heavy.com, 
April 4, 2016. 
40 “Life under Isis in Raqqa and Mosul: ‘We’re living in a giant prison’,” The Guardian, December 9, 2015. 
41 Mara Revkin, “ISIS Social Contract,” Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2016. 
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To maintain itself, Islamic State relies on multiple revenue sources. While the 
group receives some funding from individuals in the Gulf States along with ransoms for 
hostages, most of its revenue comes from black market oil sales, extortion, and taxation.42 
In a 2014 speech, the U.S. Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
David S. Cohen, identified illicit oil trade as the key source for IS funding. He reported 
that the group was able to make full use of the oil fields captured in its territory by selling 
oil to a number of groups at reduced prices, including the Kurds, Turkey, and the Assad 
regime.43 Even though Islamic State has explicitly declared all three of these forces an 
enemy of Islam and all that the group hopes to achieve, it does not refrain from selling 
them oil to profit by. By targeting oil infrastructure under IS’ control, counterinsurgency 
efforts have greatly hindered IS’ ability to produce and sell oil.  Even so, the group was 
still estimated in July of 2016 to bring in approximately 23 million USD a month.44 In 
contrast with earlier reports, a 2016 Foreign Affairs report notes that, “the organization is 
far more dependent on the cooperation of ordinary civilians than was previously 
believed.” According to recent estimates, the diverse array of taxes collected by the group 
accounts for six times as much revenue as its oil revenue.45 Islamic State has established 
what The New York Times refers to as a “predatory and violent bureaucracy.”46 This 
system of taxation and extortion includes a slew of religious, property, and agricultural 
taxes, traffic tickets, utility bills, and even “fines for smoking or wearing the wrong 
                                                
42 “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at The Carnegie 
Endowment For International Peace, ‘Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation’,” treasury.gov, October 23, 
2014. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Sarah Almukhtar, Sarah Wallace, and Time Watkins, “ISIS Has Lost Many of the Key Places it Once 
Controlled,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016. 
45 Mara Revkin, “Foreign Affairs: ISIS Social Contract,” January 12, 2016. 
46 Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Kulish, and Steven Lee Meyers,“Predatory Islamic State Wrings Money 
From Those It Rules,” The New York Times, November 19, 2015. 
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clothes.”47 As counterinsurgency forces continue to target IS infrastructure and oil fields, 
the group will likely continue to rely more heavily on the people within its areas of 
control. 
Despite counterinsurgency efforts, Islamic State still maintains control of large 
swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. These include significant locations such as Raqqa in 
Syria and Mosul in Iraq. The map below shows ISIS-held territory in Iraq and Syria as of 
June 27, 2016.48   
 
The group has also expanded its reach to other parts of the globe by calling on remote 
Jihadist groups to pledge their allegiance to IS. As of December 2015, 43 groups have 
pledged their allegiance to Islamic State49, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, Abu Sayyaf 
in the Philippines. Rohan Gunaratna, an international terrorism expert at S. Rajaratnam 
School of Security Studies in Singapore projects that Islamic State will designate “a 
                                                
47 Sarah Almukhtar, Sarah Wallace, and Time Watkins, “ISIS Has Lost Many of the Key Places it Once 
Controlled,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016. 
48 ISIS Live UA Map, November 11, 2016.  
49“Islamic State’s 43 Global Affiliates World Map,” intelcenter.com, December 15, 2015. 
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satellite of the caliphate” in the Philippines “in the coming year.”50 Although Islamic 
State has burgeoning support abroad, its central command and central focus remain 
within Iraq and Syria and the near surrounding regions. It continues to call on individuals 
to make the journey to fight within the Middle East region to establish a caliphate 
stronghold. 
Islamic State’s fighting forces within Iraq and Syria are essential to the group’s 
ability to hold onto its identity as a group striving to establish a Caliphate. The group’s 
fighters are comprised of an array of individuals from across the globe. As of June 2015, 
the intelligence community estimated that IS had a total number of fighters ranging 
anywhere from 20,000 to 31,000.51 Although Islamic State identifies itself as a religiously 
motivated group, a considerable number of its ranks include former Ba’athists who were 
left jobless by the de-Ba’athification policy implemented by Iraq’s transition government 
in 2003.52 Liz Sly of the Washington Post attributes much of Islamic State’s success to 
the de-Ba’athification policy, of which she writes, “At a stroke, 400,000 members of the 
defeated Iraqi army were barred from government employment, denied pensions — and 
also allowed to keep their guns.”53 While al-Zarqawi remained critical of former 
Ba’athists due to their secularist associations, al-Baghdadi took full advantage of this 
disenfranchised force, appointing many who were prominent military figures under 
Saddam’s rule to leadership positions within Islamic State.54 The heavy presence of 
                                                
50Per Liljas, “ISIS Is Making Inroads in the Southern Philippines and the Implications for Asia Are 
Alarming,” Time,  April 14, 2016.  
51“Robert Windrem, “ISIS By the Numbers: Foreign Fighter Total Keeps Growing,” NBC News, June 2015. 
52 Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand Behind Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” Washington Post, April 
4, 2015. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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former Ba’athists within the highest ranks of Islamic State gives rise to questions 
regarding the group’s self-purported religious dogmatism.  
Foreign fighters also make up a large portion of the group’s total fighters. 
According to the Brookings Institute, the influx of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria 
exceeds foreign fighter flows during any other conflict in modern history.55 In a 
December 2015 assessment of foreign fighter flows to Syria and Iraq, the Soufjan Group 
reported that an estimated 27,000 to 31,000 individuals had entered the region to fight for 
IS and other warring factions.56 It is difficult to determine which groups these individuals 
join once they enter Iraq and Syria, but based on the size and strength of Islamic State, a 
large portion of these fighters undeniably make the journey to fight for IS. The majority 
of foreign fighters have come from Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.57 
However, fighters are by no means limited to these regions. The Soufjan Group report 
notes foreign fighters from “at least 86 countries” now fighting within Iraq and Syria.58 A 
notable amount of individuals come from countries in the West, especially from Western 
European countries. From June 2014 to December 2015, foreign fighters stemming from 
Western Europe doubled, bringing the total number of foreign fighters coming from this 
region to an estimated 5,000.59 Among these fighters, the majority have come from 
France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium.60 Fighters stemming from North America also 
increased during this time, though their numbers remain well below 1,000 individuals.61 
                                                
55 Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?” Brookings Doha Center, 
2015, 1. 
56 “Foreign Fighters,” The Soufjan Group, December 2015, 4. 
57 Ibid., 5. 
58 Ibid., 4. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 12. 
61 Ibid., 20. 
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The graph below, created by the Brookings Institute, delineates the number of foreign 
fighters that journeyed to Syria and Iraq from the beginning of the conflict up until 
December 2015.62  
 
Reports from U.S. military officials in late 2016 have claimed that the flow of foreign 
fighters into Iraq and Syria has significantly diminished and is likely to continue to do 
so.63 Islamic State has relied heavily on pathways through Turkey for its foreign recruits 
to travel to join the group. IS made use of pre-existing trafficking networks in Turkey by 
pressuring and even threatening Turkish smugglers formerly engaged in the movement of 
small goods and fuel into smuggling in new IS recruits.64 However, increased pressure 
from the West and the threat that IS poses to Turkey’s own border has led the Turkish 
government to bulk up its border control, cutting off many of the pathways formerly 
available to potential IS foreign fighters. 
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In addition to the decreased inflow of foreign fighters, Jihadist groups in Iraq and 
Syria are experiencing an outpour of foreign fighters returning to their home countries. 
With a return rate of 20-30% (as of December 2015) of foreign fighters from Western 
countries, Western governments have raised serious concerns about the threat these 
returnees pose.65 While many foreign fighters return due to disenchantment with the 
jihadi movements they fought for and become inactive upon their return, not all returnees 
abandon jihad. One terrorist attack that killed four in Brussels and multiple foiled terrorist 
plots in the West have been carried out by individuals returning home after fighting for 
Islamic State.66 Even if relatively few returning foreign fighters feel obliged to carry out 
attacks, the threat undoubtedly exists. The deadly nature of the threat conjures deep 
concerns irrelative to the number of likely active Jihadists amongst returnees. Even one 
present among hundreds of inactive returnees could mean the mass murder of innocent 
civilians. 
 The unprecedented flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria over the course of 
the past several years is likely attributed, at least in part, to Islamic State’s heavy, well-
organized, and skillful presence online. The group has taken complete advantage of social 
media platforms to disseminate its message worldwide. David P. Fidler of the Council on 
Foreign Relations compares IS’ online activity to other terrorist organizations, stating, 
“Islamic State is more strategic online, demonstrates greater social media sophistication, 
and operates in cyberspace on a larger scale and intensity than previous terrorist 
groups.”67 The group is highly active on Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, Tumblr, and other 
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social media platforms. It utilizes the structure of these platforms by employing a 
multilevel dissemination strategy. For instance, on Twitter, the group designates several 
media-experienced members to craft and post its content and then uses a second-tier 
group of members to post the content to accounts managed by the group which are then 
spread further by its followers and sympathizers.68 The group also uses bots (artificial 
accounts) and apps designed to create more traffic to and from accounts it runs.69 In 
addition to its social media operations, the group produces two monthly online magazines 
(Dabiq and Rumiyah) and videos (mostly through its production company, al-Hayat 
Media Center) that air in a multitude of languages in attempt to reach a wide audience. In 
June of 2016, the group started al-Fatahin, a newspaper aimed at conjuring recruits for 
the group from Southeast Asia.70 Islamic State’s videos, magazines, and newspaper are 
produced with high-quality equipment by individuals who clearly demonstrate experience 
in their fields of production. 
These materials serve multiple purposes, often at the same time. For instance, by 
posting a video of the beheading of a captured rival militant, the group can 
simultaneously intimidate its adversaries and prove its ruthless dedication to its principles 
to win over potential recruits who may also be considering giving their support to rival 
Jihadi groups. Posting photos of students within its territory learning the tenets of Islam 
in a classroom portrays the state’s functionality and its dedication to Islam. Scenes such 
as this may appeal to individuals whose prior options now seem a violent chaos in 
comparison to the order depicted within Islamic State’s territory. Due to its dependence 
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on military numbers for its survival as an Islamic state, its primary objective when 
producing and releasing all of its materials is attracting susceptible individuals to come 
join IS ranks. Videos showing young men firing RPGs in slow-motion create a sense of 
action and adventure.71 Passages within its magazine speak of the obligation to perform 
hijrah (migration) to Islamic State.72 Messages about the enslavement of Yazidi women 
as sex slaves and wives appeal to potential recruits’ sexual desires and a sense of security. 
As stated earlier, the group recognizes the hindrances put on the migration of potential 
groups and has encouraged those who can’t make the journey to carry out attacks within 
their own countries. Shortly before his death in May 2016, IS spokesman al-Adnani did 
just that in a recorded speech. He stated, “If the tyrants have closed in your faces the door 
of hijrah [migration], then open in their face the door of jihad and make their act a source 
of pain for them.”73 The group prioritizes strikes against enemy civilians over enemy 
domestic military targets because it sees the former as more impactful.74 Now that 
governments are enacting stricter travel policies, many who would have traveled to fight 
in Iraq or Syria but who are now unable to may feel the need to turn their frustrations on 
their own domestic population. Adnani’s speech indicates that IS clearly understands this 
development and hopes to capitalize on it. 
In outlining Islamic State’s modus operandi, it is possible to draw several main 
conclusions about the nature of the group. Islamic State is clearly a widespread, 
organized, and successful movement. It has established a territorial stronghold with 
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military numbers and resources that allow it—for the time being—to act of its own 
volition. In its pursuit of a Caliphate, Islamic State has committed genocide, mass rape, 
and countless other atrocities, all in the name of Islam. It has caused massive carnage, a 
refugee crises, starvation, and immense suffering. Further, it has fueled anti-Muslim 
rhetoric and sentiments worldwide. Perhaps most significant, IS has put forth an image 
which individuals around the world are buying into. They are buying into it enough to 
leave their homes to go and fight for IS, and they are doing so in great enough numbers 
that IS has been able to maintain its survival and continue committing widespread 
atrocities. Islamic State has successfully identified and reached out to individuals willing 
to fight IS’ war, to slaughter Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to attack and kill civilians, 
and to end their own lives. 
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 Islamic State Materials: Analyzing IS Recruiting Success in the West 
The significant support that Islamic State has received and the severity of the 
atrocities enabled by this support demand a closer examination of the factors that lead 
individuals to join its ranks. Islamic State materials provide a window by which to try and 
answer these questions. Building upon my analysis of IS materials in the previous 
section, I will explore the motivations of those who join this movement so that better 
countermeasures can be developed to weaken IS now and to protect against (or at least be 
better equipped to fight) future movements like it. 
A bulk of news reporting exists on the issue of Islamic State’s online materials. 
The quality and quantity of and the brutality depicted in IS videos, photos, and magazines 
have captivated and horrified the public, and news agencies have responded to this in full. 
Countless reports have been made detailing the contents of the latest Islamic State videos 
and statements released for Western audiences such as CNN coverage of the appearance 
of British hostage John Cantille in IS videos75 and re-postings by Fox News of IS 
execution videos76. Beyond reports that simply inform readers of IS activity, some delve 
into an exploration of the tactics that IS uses to recruit fighters from the West and around 
the world. They often recount stories by individuals from the West who were recruited by 
or even joined the group and later returned to their home countries for one reason or 
another. For instance, The New York Times published a detailed account of one American 
woman’s online encounters with IS recruiters and their attempts to convince her to travel 
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to Syria.77 These reports relay detailed information about how Islamic State recruits, but 
they typically do not examine why these recruitment strategies see success. 
Considering the recent rise of Islamic State, a fair amount of scholarly research 
has also been done with regard to the content contained in Islamic State materials, such as 
the messaging strategies in its magazine issues and videos. The bulk of this research is 
done with the intent to track the various appeals made by IS, either across the spectrum of 
the materials it produces or the shift in the appeals made in its materials over the course 
of the group’s existence. Most of these reports categorize the types of appeals made in 
Islamic State materials in order to summarize the strategies of the group. For instance, in 
a 2016 study, Celine Marie I. Novenario does a quantitative analysis of the frequency of 
various appeals made in Dabiq and al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine.78 Novenario parses the 
appeals into five categories: Attrition, Intimidation, Provocation, Spoiling, and 
Outbidding. She then sorts the appeals made in all existing issues of Dabiq and Inspire 
into the five categories to note their frequency of occurrence. Novenario uses this data to 
draw conclusions about the differences in overarching goals and defining principles of IS 
and al-Qaeda. In a 2015 report done through The Brookings Institute, Alberto M. 
Fernandez tracks the shift in tone and style of appeals made by Islamic State as indicators 
of broader changes in the group’s priorities and identity.79 Fernandez similarly sorts 
appeals made by Islamic State in its online materials. In his analysis of IS materials, 
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including videos produced by al-Hayat media center and Tumblr posts, Fernandez cites 
urgency, agency, authenticity, and victory as the key methods of appeal.  
The reports made by Novenario and Fernandez reflect the methodology and 
purpose of the bulk of scholarly research done on IS materials thus far. By categorizing 
IS appeals into broad categories, these scholars have been able to make sense of a 
downpour of emotive images and statements put forth by Islamic State. These studies 
have aided in the characterization of Islamic State—its goals, its relationship with rival 
jihadist groups, its perception of its enemies as well as its perceptions of its own identity 
and cause. However, these reports do not extend their analysis of IS materials to a 
consideration of how these materials interact with the minds of susceptible individuals 
that consume them. 
Few studies take the next step in their analysis of IS materials to consider how 
their content shapes the affective state and the actions of potential IS recruits. Of course, 
there are exceptions. For instance, in 2016, Haroro J. Ingram produced a study which he 
rightly claims “diverges” from “trends in the current literature” on Islamic State in its 
focus on the psychological processes by which IS’ online materials work to recruit 
English-speaking individuals.80 Ingram analyzes several issues of Dabiq to develop what 
he calls an “interpretative framework” for understanding the process of remote 
radicalization. Similar to the studies of Fernandez and Novenario, Ingram sorts the 
appeals made in each issue of Dabiq into two main categories: Pragmatic and Perceptual 
appeals. From there, Ingram narrows his study to an analysis of the perceptual appeals 
because, Ingram determines, IS focuses on pragmatic factors when “targeting local 
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audiences and perceptual factors when targeting transnational audiences.”81 He then 
breaks down perceptual appeals into three subcategories: Value, Dichotomy, and Crisis. 
He believes that the trifecta of these messaging techniques (appealing to morals, 
establishing a strong “Us” vs “Them” dichotomy, and creating perceptions of immediate 
and large-scale crisis) work to encourage or even convince susceptible individuals to join 
the group, either by traveling to Syria or acting on its behalf. Ingram’s study presents a 
valuable framework for considering how susceptible individuals interact with IS appeals, 
but it is limited by two main factors. Ingram neglects to consult various mediums of 
online materials and instead only uses content from Dabiq magazine to craft his 
framework. Considering IS’ written magazine publication likely draws a different 
consumer audience than, say, a fast-paced video or a Tweet, Ingram crafts a framework 
for radicalization to a psychological profile that may not be representative of the whole 
population of susceptible English-speaking individuals. In addition, while Ingram 
attempts to focus on the radicalization of English-speaking individuals, he does not spend 
much time in his report discussing how the use of value, dichotomy, and crisis acts on an 
audience specifically remote from the conflict in Iraq and Syria. For instance, he does not 
fully develop how IS messaging works to create a sense of crisis for individuals who do 
not have direct exposure to the conflict. Although Ingram provides solid groundwork for 
considering why materials produced by IS garner recruitment success, the scope of his 
explanatory framework remains limited. 
Anthropologist Scott Atran has also presented a framework in attempt to 
understand the radicalization process. In June of 2016, Atran produced a report titled, 
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“The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict Across 
Cultures.” In it, Atran devises what he calls the Devoted Actor Theory in attempt to track 
the psychological pathways to acts of terrorism. He argues that acts of self-sacrifice and 
extreme violence result from the interplay of what he calls sacred values and identity 
fusion. “Sacred values,” Atran writes, “ refer to any preferences regarding objects, 
beliefs, or practices that people treat as both incompatible or nonfungible with profane 
issues or economic goods.”82 In other words, Sacred values are those values that are 
impervious to what are understood as rational cost-benefit determinations and cannot be 
compromised by material incentives. Identity fusion is the process by which an 
individual’s identity becomes inseparable from that of a particular collective identity. 
Atran argues that a willingness for self-sacrifice and committing acts of violence arises 
“when self identity becomes fused with a unique collective identity and when identity 
itself is fused with sacred values that provide all group members a similar sense of 
significance.”83 Atran argues that such a fusion of individual identity to a group and the 
fusion of group identity (and consequently individual identity) to sacred values comes 
about through “intimate social networks of ‘imagined kin’” and fuels acts of terrorism 
when there is a perceived “existential threat from outside groups” (198). Said differently, 
the formation of a tight-knit group with a strong collective identity shaped by 
uncompromisable values is most likely to occur when the intragroup relations emulate 
familial bonds. Furthermore, members of the group are more likely to engage in terrorism 
when they believe there to be a grave threat to the existence of their group and its sacred 
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values. Atran’s report, however, does not look specifically at Islamic State or the 
messages it produces. 
My analysis of Islamic State materials expands on the work done by Ingram and 
Atran to create a fuller explanation of the workings of IS messaging on its audience in the 
West. To ensure that my analysis accurately considers the makeup of the group of 
susceptible English-speaking individuals, I consider two different mediums of IS 
materials: Issues of Dabiq and videos from the al-Hayat Media Center. Specifically, I 
take representative pieces from each medium (two issues from Dabiq and two videos 
produced by al-Hayat). The two mediums were chosen under the assumption that the 
magazine publications and film productions put forth by Islamic State present different 
appeals in differing forms and therefore likely attract different audiences. While it 
includes battlefront photojournalism, Dabiq is largely comprised of editorial pieces and 
scripturally-based religious arguments. In contrast, videos produced by al-Hayat 
primarily feature highly visual depictions of battlefront action and life as an IS fighter.  
In line with methods used by recent scholars, I categorize the various appeals 
made by Islamic State in its magazine and videos into two broad categories: Individual 
Appeals and Group Appeals. Individual appeals are those made in direct relation to the 
fears and desires of the individual without explicit ties to a group cause or group identity. 
In contrast, Group appeals use messages that connect the individual’s fears and desires to 
a group cause or group identity.  
After analyzing IS appeals within the context of these two categories, I devise my 
own interpretive framework to explain how IS materials interact with susceptible 
individuals in the West that consume them. I utilize the information gathered in the 
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analysis and incorporate empirical knowledge outlined in the first section as well as 
explanatory hypotheses presented by Ingram and Atran to create a framework that 
focuses specifically on the effect of IS materials on English-speaking individuals living in 
the West.  
Analysis 
Fewer messages from Islamic State fall explicitly into the Individual appeals category 
than into the Group appeals category. In fact, IS often uses messages which denounce the 
pursuit of selfish desires. For instance, there are two pages in Issue 4 allocated to the idea 
that men who battle for “booty and fame” will “get nothing” from Allah.84  
However, a closer consideration of IS materials reveals that the group pays 
diligent attention to individual desires. Although Dabiq denounces fighting for the sake 
of “booty” or “fame,” it also argues that the prospers that a fighter does receive from the 
spoils of war are deserved gifts from Allah. One article states that the “people of tawhid 
and obedience to Allah are more deserving of wealth than the people of kufr in Allah and 
shirk.” So, although IS says one shouldn’t fight for the sake of seeking out material gain, 
it also implies that material gain is a product of worthy battle that shall be won by those 
who fight with the group.  
One of the most prevalent individual appeals made by Islamic State is the 
utilitarian appeal to the pleasure or the pain one will experience in the afterlife based on 
his actions in the current life. These appeals often claim that sacrifices in this life will 
lead to greater wealth in the afterlife. For instance, one passage in Dabiq writes, “A 
battalion of soldiers who battles fi sabilillah (for the sake of Allah) and gets its share of 
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the booty receives in advance two thirds of their reward from the Hereafter and only one-
third will remain (for the Hereafter). If they do not receive any booty, they will get their 
full reward.”85 On a similar note, one British fighter in an IS recruitment video titled, 
“There is No Life Without Jihad” claims, “If you sacrifice something for Allah, Allah 
will give you seven hundred times more than this.”86 Rather than denouncing the desire of 
the individual to seek pleasure and prosperity, IS claims that withholding from pursuing 
selfish desires right away will result in an increase in pleasure later on. Islamic State also 
makes this utilitarian argument in negative terms in order to play on the fears of potential 
recruits. Islamic State claims that those who do not join the fight will suffer endlessly in 
the afterlife. One British fighter in “There is No Life Without Jihad” states, “Know that if 
you fear death and that’s what prevents you, death will reach you anyway, but it will be 
more painful for you than those who get Shahada.”87 The combination of negative and 
positive incentives for outcomes in the afterlife reinforces Islamic State’s call to fight by 
encouraging fighters to avoid pain and seek out pleasure. 
Similarly, instead of denouncing sexual desires altogether, IS offers recruits an 
opportunity to fulfill those desires in a way that is “legal” within Islam. In an article of 
Dabiq titled, “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” IS argues for the enslavement of 
Yazidi women and children as concubines. Among several arguments for the use of 
concubines, the article proclaims that “a man who cannot afford marriage to a free 
woman finds himself surrounded by temptation towards sin.”88 It explains that a man can 
                                                
85 Ibid., 31. 
86 “There is No Life Without Jihad,” al-Hayat Media Center video, 13:26, Posted by jihadology.net, June 
2014.  
87 Ibid. 
88 “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” Dabiq, Issue 4, 17. 
29 
 
have sex with his concubine and evade the sin of having a sexual relationship that defies 
Islamic law.89 Instead of encouraging its readers to repress their sexual desires, this Dabiq 
article validates those desires and offers its readers a chance to act on them without 
religious consequence. In fact, the article pushes for the idea that concubines are a 
necessary piece of Islamic State’s approach toward “the Hour,” meaning the prophesied 
last battle that restores the Islamic world order. A passage near the end of the article 
implies this: “...it is interesting to note that slavery has been mentioned as one of the 
signs of the Hour.”90 By granting an opportunity for individuals to have “legal” sex 
outside marriage, IS appeals directly to the individual’s sensuous desires. This appeal is 
likely to strike a chord with young males who live in communities or families which 
shame such desires and force the repression of them. 
 In its materials, Islamic State not only offers individuals a chance to express their 
aggression through sexual acts but also through acts of extreme violence. Islamic State’s 
video footage of combat does not shy away from blood and gore. To the contrary, it 
focuses heavily on this aspect of combat. The last nearly fifteen minutes of “Flames of 
War” shows Islamic State fighters piling up dead and wounded opposition soldiers and 
shooting them at point blank as well as a mass execution of P.O.W.’s. Near the end of 
“Flames of War,” an English-speaking IS fighter stands in front of kneeling POW’s, 
yielding a gun. He gestures with the hand that holds the gun while he speaks of Islamic 
State’s superior power. Other scenes show close-up shots of individual IS fighters 
pumping their guns in the air and smiling in celebration. All of these scenes convey to 
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potential recruits the chance to become untethered from repressive forces and act with 
unrestrained aggression. 
 The fast-paced, highly visual, and action-focused nature of the al-Hayat videos 
fetishize combat in a way that Dabiq cannot. Where Dabiq calls on individuals to fight on 
the basis of duty, videos like “Flames of War” fetishize military combat to make it seem 
like an adventurous, fulfilling experience. Islamic State depicts military combat in its 
videos in such a way that it offers individuals an opportunity to live out a video game-like 
fantasy. Throughout “Flames of War,” there are numerous slow motion shots of fighters 
firing RPG’s and other large-scale artillery. These shots are often followed by 
audiovisual techniques that aim to mirror shell-shock (high-pitched noise, muffled sounds 
of surrounding action, blurred camera focus, etc.). The combat coverage is also often 
taken from first-person perspective (jerky close-ups of running through trenches, noise of 
someone’s heavy breathing, etc.). Both of these techniques are used in many first-person 
shooter video games because they intensify the action. It is likely that many susceptible 
individuals of recruitment age in the West play these types of games. Islamic State offers 
them a chance to turn the game into a reality. 
 IS also makes appeals to the individual on the basis of respect and prestige. For 
instance, the first issue of Dabiq includes “A Call to All Muslim Doctors, Engineers, 
Scholars, and Specialists” to come join Islamic State.91 It argues, “People are ignorant of 
their religion and they thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it.”92 
IS offers educated individuals a chance to boost their status and become respected experts 
in their line of work with Islamic State. The appeal to ambitious professionals is reified 
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through Dabiq’s depiction of IS’ state-building projects, such as constructing roads and 
bridges, providing healthcare to the needy, establishing relations with regional tribes, and 
interpreting and enforcing Sharia Law. Dabiq gives the illusion of career opportunities 
for large-scale projects for which educated individuals could lead the community. The al-
Hayat videos selected for the analysis do not make direct appeals to respect and prestige, 
but they exemplify the appeals through the manner in which they portray IS fighters from 
the West. In “There is No Life Without Jihad,” all of the individuals featured speak with 
a sense of authority and knowledge. They speak in a matter-of-fact tone and address the 
camera with a direct but calm conviction. They appear as important figures imparting 
wisdom on their audience. This depiction of IS fighters from the West as respected, 
keynote individuals makes the attainment of such prestige upon joining the group seem 
possible.  
The majority of appeals made by Islamic State are made within the context of 
group identity and group values. To strengthen its own identity, Islamic State heavily 
depends on its perceived foes. The group has created a rigid “Us” and “Them” 
dichotomy, leaving no room for a middle ground. Dabiq undoubtedly builds on this 
dichotomy. In an article titled “The Fading Grayzone,” Islamic State quotes Osama Bin 
Laden: “So the world today is divided into two camps.”93 It warns that anyone who does 
not fully recognize the significance of Islamic State’s mission “should review his faith 
before death suddenly takes him while he stands with one foot in the trench of the 
crusaders and the other in the trench of the hypocrites whilst claiming he is in the 
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grayzone! The mujahid knows no grayzone.”94 It continues, “He who aligns with [the 
Crusaders] by a single word falls into apostasy—extreme apostasy.”95 IS furthers this 
dichotomy in its videos. One of the very first statements made in “Flames of War” is that 
you are either “with us or against us.”96 “The message is clear. Neutrality does not exist. 
If you don’t actively support Islamic State, you oppose it; the result is turmoil, death, and 
suffering in the afterlife. From a recruitment perspective, it condemns passivity in those 
who may be entertaining the ideas of Islamic State and requires that they commit 
themselves wholly to the group.  
 Islamic State bolsters its “Us” and “Them” dichotomy by crafting juxtapositions 
between the two. Where the ingroup is good, just, brave, and holy, the outgroup is evil, 
amoral, cowardly, and dirty. One of the places this becomes most evident is in Dabiq’s 
images of wartime casualties. Images associated with the enemy typically depict one of 
two scenes. The first are images of disfigured, often faceless corpses piled on top of each 
other. They give the impression that Islamic State’s enemies are “filthy” (a word 
frequently used in IS materials to describe its enemies) and subhuman. This 
dehumanization of enemy soldiers by IS members is demonstrated clearly when one IS 
fighter in “Flames of War” is seen rapidly firing at the corpse of an opposition fighter at 
point blank, shouting, “Be gone you dog, you filth!”97 “Flames of War” employs the same 
tactics by putting a dark overlay on shots of George Bush and Barack Obama while 
brightening the exposure of its own fighters so that they seem bathed in light. In one part 
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of the film, the narrator even describes how “light glowed from the Mujahidin.”98 The 
second kind of wartime images commonly shown are those of deceased Sunni women 
and children accompanied by text attributing the deaths to IS’ enemies. Islamic State 
capitalizes fully on the carnage resulting from U.S. airstrikes to paint the U.S. as a 
malicious entity that intends to degrade and to kill all Muslims.  
 In response, Islamic State frames itself as the defender of justice and the protector 
of innocent Muslims. In both Issue 1 and Issue 4 of Dabiq, images of dead children are 
followed by segments displaying “retaliation” through rocket launches and beheadings. 
The theme of Islamic State as protector is evident throughout Dabiq. It plays on a 
narrative of victimization in order to cast itself as the entity that is leading the fight for 
Muslim safety and dignity. One passage reads, “The time has come for those generations 
that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and 
being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect - 
the time has come for them to rise.”99  
By making those opposing the group look like villainous aggressors toward 
Muslims, Islamic State implores individuals who identify with those being oppressed to 
act. Dabiq plays heavily on a sense of duty to fight for one’s kin. One passage asks its 
readers, “How can you enjoy life and sleep while not aiding your brothers, not casting 
fear into the hearts of the cross worshippers, and not responding to their strikes with 
multitudes more?”100 IS fighters from the West shown sitting in a conversational 
semicircle in “There is No Life Without Jihad” communicate similar messages. One 
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British fighter implores, “Ask yourself is this what I’ve selected and chosen?...While you 
know your brothers are out there on the front lines facing the bullets, the bombs, and 
everything the enemy of Allah has while you’re sitting in comfort, while you’re sleeping, 
while you’re going shopping, they’re giving their blood, they’re sleeping on the 
floor....”101  
Islamic State further differentiates itself from other groups  by centering its 
messages around its mission to create a Caliphate. In regard to establishing a Caliphate, 
one article in Dabiq’s first issue claims it is a feat that “many religious people have 
shunned and avoided on account of the hardship it entails itself and on account of the 
hardship entailed in working to establish it.”102 Dabiq claims this is not so with Islamic 
State. The magazine puts forth the idea that IS’ willingness to pursue such a hard task 
proves it is the only legitimate force fighting for Islam.  
Instead of making its military defeats look easy, IS plays up the asymmetrical 
nature of the fight (IS being the side with less force and numbers that “the crusaders”) to 
bolster the legitimacy of its mission. IS repeatedly notes that its foes have superior U.S.-
supplied weaponry in its magazine and video coverage of military battles. One fighter in 
“There is No Life Without Jihad” speaks about Islamic State’s victories over its 
opposition: “They train their whole lives and they have got these new weapons and we’re 
wiping them...day by day...This is proof that Allah is with us.”103 When IS rhetorically 
                                                
101 “There is No Life Without Jihad,” al-Hayat Media Center video, 13:26, Posted by jihadology.net, June 
2014.  
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pits itself against all the odds, its victories become miraculous; they become testaments to 
Allah’s support for the group’s mission. 
 
 
Framework 
My own analysis of group appeals made in IS materials reveals a radicalization process 
of susceptible English-speaking individuals that reifies the work of Ingram and Atran. 
Evidence in my analysis suggests the importance of Ingram’s trifecta of messaging 
techniques (Value, Dichotomy, and Crisis) in convincing susceptible individuals to join 
Islamic State. Further, evidence brought out in my analysis suggests that the interplay of 
value, dichotomy, and crisis in Islamic State’s messages mobilize radicalization through a 
process that can be explained by Atran’s Devoted Actor Theory. 
        The nature of the group appeals in IS materials indicate a process of identity fusion, 
namely the fusion of susceptible individuals’ identities to Islamic State’s group identity. 
IS clearly works to draw a distinct line between itself and the rest of the world. It 
removes the “gray zone” of neutrality and claims that all who are not with the group are 
against it. In turn, Islamic State paints itself as good, just, brave, and holy, and its foes 
(which include everyone not supporting the group) as evil, amoral, cowardly, and dirty. 
In the West, this rigid dichotomy works to alienate individuals from the local, regional, 
and national societies from which they likely already feel distant. Someone who 
identifies himself as “other” within his society and is likely treated by those around him 
as an outsider may find more similarities with the community that Islamic State depicts in 
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its online materials. Islamic State renders distinct identities for itself and its foes that push 
susceptible individuals to align their own identities with that of the ingroup in order to 
escape the isolation and shame that comes from affiliation with the outgroup. 
         In accordance with the Devoted Actor Theory, Islamic State has adopted sacred 
values which cannot be compromised and which are essential to the group’s identity. 
Foremost in Islamic State’s values is the creation of a Caliphate. Establishing a physical 
Caliphate is the crux of Islamic State’s mission, as well as the key characteristic 
differentiating it from rival factions. Most importantly, the Caliphate is the key factor in 
fulfilling the prophetic narrative (establishing a Caliphate, spreading “Islam” all over the 
world,” defeating the Crusaders in one final battle, and restoring Islamic world order 
before the Final Hour) summoned heavily throughout IS materials. Consequently, Islamic 
State depends on the possession of land for its existence as the legitimate force it claims 
to be. This dependence necessitates violent action when its land (and therefore its 
mission) is threatened. 
As both Atran and Ingram discuss, Islamic State’s materials evoke a sense of 
crisis. For English-speaking individuals who do not interact directly with the conflict, 
Islamic State creates an acute sense of crisis by portraying Muslims as victims and the 
West and its regional allies as villains. Islamic State crafts a conspiratorial narrative that 
makes it seem as though Western powers and what it refers to as its “regional puppets” 
are waging a crusade against Muslims.104 People in the West are seen as either 
committing or condoning horrible atrocities against innocent Muslims. It then becomes 
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the duty of those individuals living in the West who identify with Islamic State to stop the 
Crusaders and restore peace and dignity to Muslims. 
         While my analysis of group appeals proves consistent with the work of Ingram 
and Atran, my analysis of individual appeals made by Islamic State suggests that 
individual-based incentives play a larger role in convincing recruits from the West to join 
the group than Atran or Ingram pay note. My analysis of IS materials indicates that, while 
the process of radicalization laid out by Ingram and Atran explains the pathway for 
individuals to carrying out violent action for a group cause, some susceptible individuals 
in the West may initially join the group out of a desire for personal gain as much as, or 
perhaps more than, out of identification with the particular group they are joining. 
 Islamic State advertises to individuals in the West a chance to escape the hollow, 
aimless feeling that often accompanies life within a materialistic society to experience an 
action-packed adventure with a clear objective. One British IS fighter in “There is No 
Life Without Jihad” states, “To all my brothers living in the West, I know how you 
feel...when I used to live there...In your heart, you feel depressed...the cure for the 
depression is Jihad fi sabilillah (for the sake of God). You feel like you have no 
honor...come to Jihad and feel the honor we are feeling. Feel the happiness that we are 
feeling.” Individual appeals made by Islamic State offer potential recruits the chance to 
experience happiness, a sense of purpose, power, and license to express their aggression. 
Instead of only appealing to susceptible Muslim individuals on the basis of Islam, Islamic 
State casts its web to reach thrill-seeking individuals who may not even be religious at 
the time of their encounter with IS materials but who feel aimless, underappreciated, or 
oppressed in their current existence. 
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 Within the lens of individual appeals, it could be argued that Islamic State’s 
limited-time-offer for glory is just as important, if not more important, than evoking a 
sense of crisis to the process of pushing susceptible individuals to actually take the step to 
join the group. My analysis of IS materials indicates that a perceived significance of this 
particular moment in history may lead English-speaking individuals to take it upon 
themselves to travel to IS’ territory or to act on its behalf. Islamic State’s prophetic 
narrative marks the present moment as one of historic significance, one that all previous 
events have been leading up to. As such, Islamic State creates a sense of urgency in those 
who are considering joining the group, and the decision to join becomes time-sensitive. If 
one does not join Islamic State in time, he will be grouped in with the Kufir (the 
disbelievers) and suffer at the hands of Islamic State (and ultimately Allah), whose 
victory has been predestined. One IS fighter captured this perfectly when he said, “You 
can be here in these golden times...or you can be on the sidelines…”105 This sense of 
urgency leads individuals living in the West who subscribe to the significance of this time 
in history to demonstrate their support for Islamic State in order to reap the benefits of the 
group’s rise to power and to evade eternal suffering. 
Conclusion 
Islamic State is not crafting new sentiments out of thin air. It is capitalizing on 
pre-existing frustrations, notions of identity, and fundamental characteristics of human 
nature in order to deepen the divide between susceptible individuals and the Western 
societies in which they live. The messaging used in Dabiq and al-Hayat videos hits on the 
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elements identified by previous scholars as crucial to the radicalization process. For 
instance, IS uses a strong “Us” and “Them” dichotomy to push individuals who have 
already experienced a sense of otherness within their country of residence to adopt 
Islamic State’s online community as their own. Islamic State uses the Anti-Muslim 
rhetoric and sentiments burgeoning in the West—some of which stems directly from IS’ 
own attacks—to its full advantage in order to guide alienated individuals to its online 
community.  
Islamic State defines itself through its mission to establish a Caliphate, making 
the pursuit of its cause necessary to the group’s survival and therefore nonnegotiable. It 
differentiates itself from all other groups by identifying itself as the sole group that is 
truly dedicated to Islam in its quest to establish a Caliphate. It then bolsters its legitimacy 
by capturing land and displaying its “miraculous” military victories as signs of Allah’s 
support.  
Its mission has also not come out of thin air. Although Islamic State is using 
ruthless and sacrilegious means to establish what it deems a Caliphate, the desire to 
create an Islamic State in itself has long existed across the Islamic world. It is backed by 
sentiments that regard today’s territorial boundaries in the Middle East as arbitrary 
borders shaped by colonialist powers in the Sykes-Picot Agreement post-WWI.  
Islamic State utilizes the sense of crisis triggered by intense and ongoing conflict 
in Syria and Iraq to urge individuals in the West to do something about it. For instance, it 
uses the atrocities committed by Assad and the civilian deaths caused by U.S. airstrikes to 
paint itself as the force that can end the slaughter of Muslims. It focuses its messaging on 
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its foes’ violence toward Muslims and paints its own cause as one to restore honor and 
power to Muslims, who have long been slaughtered, humiliated, and put down.  
Islamic State not only capitalizes on sentiments regarding Islam and geopolitics, it 
also uses the sense of aimlessness and alienation experienced by almost all young people 
at one point or another to its full advantage. IS attributes this aimlessness to the West’s 
hedonistic materialism and portrays itself as the solution to the emptiness felt by young, 
alienated individuals. Its videos and magazine appeal directly to these individuals with 
fast-paced coverage of combat and depictions of a life of sacrifice for a cause greater than 
oneself, and one that leads to a blissful afterlife. At the individual level, IS advertises a 
chance to yield power, express aggression, and go on a purposeful adventure. 
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Counter-Narratives: Efforts of the U.S. State Department 
 
The success of Islamic State’s online messaging has triggered attempts around the 
world to create counter-narratives. In the United States, the attempt to challenge Islamic 
State’s narrative took the form of an online campaign by the State Department called 
“Think Again, Turn Away.” The campaign met its demise after its production of a short 
video in 2014 titled, “Run, Do Not Walk to ISIS Land.” The video takes the same images 
depicted in videos made by Islamic State and attempts to point out the sacrilege of the 
group. For instance, the video displays text like, “Where you can learn useful new skills 
for the Ummah!” and proceeds to show Islamic State blowing up mosques, carrying out 
suicide bombings inside mosques, and crucifying Muslims.106 The video and the program 
received extremely negative flack from the press and governmental officials for its 
callous use of graphic images and its sardonic tone. 
The U.S. State Department then launched the “Global Engagement Center” 
(GEC) in March of 2016. The State Department website describes GEC as an 
“interagency entity” that is “charged with coordinating U.S. counterterrorism messaging 
to foreign audiences.” The website writes that the GEC is “focused on partner-driven 
messaging and data analytics.” Due to the classified nature of the GEC’s work, it is 
difficult to track down which groups it is partnering with and the methods it is using to 
carry out and apply its data analysis. However, the GEC has also produced its own public 
content with the intention of “decreasing the allure of ISIL and preventing the 
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recruitment of new extremists.”107 This content exists in the form of several video series 
on the Global Engagement Center’s YouTube channel.  
The availability of this content has enabled me to evaluate the State Department’s 
counter-messaging strategies in relation to the recruitment strategies of Islamic State laid 
out in the second section. The GEC’s YouTube channel features two video series (“Life 
Under Daesh” and “Daesh Defectors/Why They Left Daesh”) as well as several other 
videos that don’t fall into a specific series. To most efficiently evaluate the GEC’s efforts, 
I will consider the general counter-narrative approaches taken in each of the video series 
as well as in a few of the non-series videos. In evaluating this material, I will determine 
in what ways, if any, the State Department’s counter-narratives act to appeal to 
susceptible individuals and to challenge or break down IS’ framework of recruitment 
identified in the second section.  
The following evaluation and recommendations are content-focused and do not 
assess the effect of the source of the content. Specifically, I do not consider whether the 
videos’ overt production by an entity of the U.S. State Department hinders or rules out 
their attempts to reach and appeal to susceptible individuals.  
Evaluation 
The “Life Under Daesh” video series compares the reality of life in IS territory with the 
quality of life depicted in Islamic State materials. The videos—all under two minutes—
cover seven topics related to life under IS rule: Extortion, violence, healthcare, food, 
energy, education, and infrastructure. Each of the videos juxtaposes the images of life in 
IS-held cities released by Islamic State with images and videos recorded covertly by 
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civilians and reporters in the area. Typed text at the bottom of the screen and voiceover 
testimonials from defectors supplement the video footage and underline the 
inefficiencies, injustices, and corruption that go on under IS rule. The text in one video 
states, “Bodies of victims are often left displayed for days at a time...serving as a chilling 
reminder of Daesh’s brutality and injustice.”108 A narrator in another video states, “Daesh 
has published photos of its fighters and supporters enjoying bountiful feasts. Every day, 
however, people living under their rule are forced to wait in line at the local soup 
kitchens.”109 With each video covering one aspect of city life, the “Life Under Daesh” 
video series is designed to point out the false reality of life in the Caliphate advertised by 
Islamic State in its own materials. 
These videos attempt to foil a key facet of Islamic State’s identity—its claim to its 
ability to create a utopian Caliphate. Although the videos depict the unattractive truths of 
civilian life within IS-held territory, they do not get at the heart of the forces driving 
individuals in the West to join Islamic State identified by the framework in the second 
section. The current level of functionality of the Caliphate is not fundamental to Islamic 
State’s identity. The group’s slogan is “lasting and expanding,” and its current existence 
is one of a constant state of war to protect its territory and to gain more. Its priority is to 
recruit individuals willing to fight for the protection and expansion of this territory. As 
discussed in the first section, Islamic State’s territories are characterized by corruption, 
coercion and ineffective governance, but effective governance is not a linchpin of its 
sacred values; possession of land for the continued construction of the Caliphate is. 
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This is not to say that the “Life Under Daesh” videos are not effective in some 
respects. They work to delegitimize Islamic State’s materials by pointing out the major 
discrepancies between the life IS shows in its materials and the actual reality of life on 
the ground. Pointing out these discrepancies may work to break down the level of trust 
susceptible individuals have in the Islamic State materials they engage with. Introducing 
even a small amount of skepticism hampers Islamic State’s ability to align its own 
identity with that of susceptible individuals. 
The “Daesh Defectors” and “Why They Left Daesh” series focuses more closely 
on the brutality of Islamic State toward Muslims. Each video features one defector and 
begins with a jarring quotation from him or her. One video begins with a quotation from 
female defector: “The worst thing I ever saw was a man getting his head hacked off right 
in front of me.”110 Another video covers a male defector recounting gruesome killings 
such as seeing very old Emir executed, a young boy beheading a prisoner, and regular 
civilian executions.111 
The “Daesh Defectors” and “Why They Left Daesh” video series has the 
advantage of creating an intense personal viewpoint from which stories of  violence are 
recounted. Defectors share their emotions and thoughts in relation to their experiences 
with Islamic State. A female defector recounts, “At the start, I was happy. I was carrying 
a gun. It was something new. I had authority. I didn’t think I was frightening anyone, but 
then I started asking myself where am I? Where am I going? I could feel the tides 
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dragging me someplace ugly.”112 A defector captured by FSA states that he feels 
“deceived” by Islamic State.113 Text at the end of this video writes, “After seeing how he 
was manipulated, betrayed, and sent to face his death, Abdullah has come to realize ISIS 
has little value for human life, even for its own members.”114 Several of the videos 
dramatize feelings of confusion, regret, and remorse through distorted footage of a young 
male sitting with his head in his hands and asking forgiveness from Allah for what he had 
done while he was an IS fighter.115 By voicing the experiences of disaffected defectors, 
these videos attempt to show (as in the “Life Under Daesh” videos) that Islamic State is 
not what it says it is.  
 The shortcomings of this video series are similar to those of the “Life Under 
Daesh” series. Again, the videos do not wholly target the elements of Islamic State that 
are essential to its identity. While displaying Islamic State’s violence against Muslims 
does work to blur the line between the “Us” (protectors of Muslims) and “Them” 
(aggressors toward Muslims) dichotomy depicted in Islamic State materials, the series’ 
focus on Islamic State’s acts of gruesome violence toward any population is not time well 
spent. Islamic State promotes itself as a violent and merciless group. The fact that Islamic 
State beheads and severely punishes people who it accuses of transgressions against 
Islam (Muslims included) is not unknown to susceptible individuals. It is a part of Islamic 
State’s MO.  
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These videos assume that individuals in the West who leave to join Islamic State 
do so out of a desire to experience a sense of piety and heroism that operates within the 
parameters of traditional moral constructs. To the contrary, Islamic State is defined by 
moral and religious codes that encourage and even require violence, and the group makes 
these codes evident in its own messaging. This is part of the attraction for susceptible 
individuals. The group’s acts of violence demonstrate its steadfast dedication to its cause. 
Focusing on IS’ violence toward and killing of Muslims within its territories may 
work to challenge its advertised identity as the protector of innocent Muslims, but the 
empirical realities of the region lend support to IS’ ability to maintain its image as 
protector in the eyes of susceptible individuals. For instance, the atrocities committed by 
Assad and the civilian deaths caused by U.S. airstrikes make it difficult to derail the 
group’s image as protector. Islamic State’s purported mission to restore dignity and 
power to Muslims is backed by its opposition to the Assad regime and other forces 
deemed predatory to Muslims and Islam. In addition, the violence against Muslims within 
IS territory may work to reiterate the group’s dedication to “true” Islam through its 
execution of those who defy it and the instatement of Sharia Law (as IS understands it) 
through the strict enforcement of draconian punishments.  
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Recommendations 
Assuming that content overtly produced by the U.S. State Department through the Global 
Engagement Center has the potential to reach and to dissuade susceptible individuals 
from joining or acting on the behalf of Islamic State, there are several ways in which the 
GEC can produce more effective video content. Appeals should be made with the intent 
to break down the fundamental values adopted and advertised by Islamic State. These 
include IS’ possession of land, its identity as the sole group pursuing “true” Islam in the 
form of a Caliphate, and its claims of invincibility resulting from the support of Allah.  
 Islamic State’s use of a prophetic narrative, its reliance on possession of land for 
its identity, and its self-legitimization through military victories makes the group’s 
defining principles vulnerable to attack from empirical realities. The GEC should use 
these empirical realities to chip away at the group’s identity. The GEC has done this in 
some respects by showing the failures of IS’ governance within its territories and its 
coercive treatment of Muslims, but it can do much more. Instead of focusing on IS’ acts 
of violence, counter-narrative content should visually demonstrate Islamic State’s loss of 
territory over the course of the past several years. It should highlight military victories 
against Islamic State as they occur. In this approach, there is no need to “create” a 
narrative, rather the idea is to present the on-the-ground facts in such a way that 
demonstrates the rising pattern of military losses incurred by Islamic State. One “Think 
Again, Turn Away” video on the GEC’s YouTube Channel, titled “ISIS Inside the Tent” 
attempts to do this but fails to reach its full potential. This video features IS fighters 
gathered inside a tent, boasting their military strength and victories and then cuts to 
photos and videos of mangled or exploding IS vehicles and tanks as well as photos of 
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opposition fighters taking down IS flags in recaptured territories. However, the footage 
only depicts singular victories and does not distinctly map out an overarching trend of 
losses for Islamic State. It also uses a photo of a tent—an image not verifiably linked 
with Islamic State—as a visual representation of where the Islamic State fighters featured 
in the video are speaking from within. This adds a level of fictitiousness that is not 
necessary and weakens the reliability of the factual information presented. Counter-
narratives should avoid visual representations of actualities whenever possible to keep 
from appearing as though they are stretched truths or altogether contrived. 
 To break down the “Us” and “Them” dichotomy built up by Islamic State in its 
materials, counter-narratives should voice the contempt and fear of Muslims living under 
IS rule for the group. As the “Life Under Daesh” and “Daesh Defectors” series aimed to 
do, new content should challenge IS’ identity as “protector.” However, videos should not 
show images of corpses hanging from city squares; rather, they should show testimonials 
from men, women, and children who have been treated brutally by IS in order to 
humanize the many victims of Islamic State. The GEC produced a video titled, “In an 
ISIS Prison: Rescued Daesh Captives Speak,” which shows rescued captives speaking 
about IS’ horrific treatment of them and their desire to return to their families. This video 
is particularly powerful because it uses real footage with little to no supplementary text or 
images. The captives’ testimonials demonstrate IS’ inhuman treatment of Muslims with 
sincere emotion and specific, true stories. An effort should be made to feature more 
testimonials from those who experience IS’ indiscriminate brutality. Again, the videos 
should not use visual representations of this brutality; they must use real and personal 
content. 
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The lack of on-the-ground video footage presented in the GEC videos as well as 
the poor quality of the GEC videos (often more PowerPoint-like than film-like) is 
something that also need to be addressed if the State Department hopes to challenge the 
appeals made in Islamic State’s well-polished and intimate films and magazine issues. If 
the State Department intends to continue producing its own counter-narrative to Islamic 
State, it must do so with full commitment, meaning with increased resources—funding, 
equipment, and staff—to create a media team that gives strong counter-narratives a 
chance to be seen and trusted. 
Effectively challenging IS’ recruiting framework requires a multifaceted approach 
that goes beyond the production of counter-narrative materials online. For such counter-
narratives to take hold, the on-the-ground reality must support the messages that the 
Global Engagement Center puts forth. The best way to depict Islamic State as the losing 
side is to ensure that it continues to face military losses that indicate an increasing pattern 
of defeat. The group’s identity and its legitimacy depend on its ability to sell itself as the 
founders of a Caliphate and the fulfiller of the prophetic narrative. If the group loses all 
of its territory and is forced to go into hiding, it will have a much more difficult time 
advertising itself as such. 
Additionally, the U.S. should consider applying more stringent criteria when 
determining whether or not to carry out drone strikes. For instance, it should reduce its 
use of signature strikes. Signature strikes demand an extremely low level of distinction 
when identifying targets as legitimate, and they result in increased civilian casualties, 
which Islamic State uses fully to its advantage in its online recruitment materials. By 
depicting images of innocent victims in U.S. drone strikes, Islamic State is able to rally 
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support both regionally and globally for its cause. Additionally, continued use of drone 
strikes by the U.S. should be supported by an on-the-ground military presence, which will 
allow the U.S. to more closely control the narrative that arises surrounding airstrikes. It is 
probable that IS sometimes stages civilian casualties in its materials to look as though 
they resulted from U.S. strikes when they may have actually resulted from another 
fighting force or from IS itself. Should the U.S. continue its military activity in the region 
(which it shows no signs of stopping), it should supplement its airstrikes with a heavier 
presence on the ground to better get a handle on such narratives.  
These recommendations aim to address the most immediate challenges faced by 
the United States in preventing remote recruitment of its citizens by Islamic State. Losing 
control of the crucial regions IS currently possesses will surely weaken the group’s 
ability to produce online recruitment materials using the line of appeals it currently 
employs. However, the underlying forces that have enabled Islamic State’s recruitment 
success will continue to enable the group’s survival (if only in a different form) as well as 
the rise of other future extremist groups. 
These underlying forces still have to be addressed. To do so, the State Department 
should not only focus on counter narratives and military victories, it should also build 
alternative narratives and support programs that seek to compete with the individual 
appeals made by IS. These narratives and programs need to go beyond the provision of 
financial stability and security; they must reach into the same deep desires of young 
hearts—desires for a sense of purpose and adventure—that Islamic State appeals to. Scott 
Atran stressed this point in his address to the UN Security Council in 2015. He asked, 
“When did moderate anything have wide appeal to youth yearning for adventure, for 
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glory, and for significance?”116 Those tasked with countering violent extremism in the 
U.S. should find ways to offer susceptible individuals a chance to have meaningful and 
exciting experiences within a community that allows them to shape their identity. The 
best way to do this is by supporting what Atran refers to as “local initiatives,” rather than 
by attempting to create nation-wide policies. These initiatives can take many forms—
sports leagues, weekly dialogues, outdoors clubs, theater and arts centers—but they 
should be run at the local level in order to enable the formation of more intimate 
connections between young individuals in the community. Locally fueled initiatives will 
allow for the cultivation of tight-knit bonds, thus reducing susceptible individuals’ need 
to seek out an online community in the first place.  
Lastly, efforts to prevent remote radicalization have to extend past narratives and 
programs designed to reach susceptible populations by addressing another key 
contributing force to the radicalization process: xenophobia. The U.S. State Department 
has to put forth an equally committed effort to create narratives and programs that 
challenge xenophobia and anti-Muslim rhetoric and sentiments. Islamic State thrives off 
of anti-Muslim sentiments in the West; these sentiments cultivate perfect candidates for 
IS recruitment by alienating young Muslim individuals from their communities and 
breeding animosity. There should be strong efforts made to better educate Americans 
from a young age about Islam as a religion and culture in order to combat the false 
perceptions of Islam promoted day in and day out in the media and on the news. Through 
what Atran calls “the unholy alliance of narrow, xenophobic nationalism and militant 
jihad,” Islamic State and other extremist groups are able to fuel the fire of anti-Muslim 
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sentiments by carrying out attacks on Western soil, consequently wedging a deeper 
divide between susceptible individuals and their communities and pushing them closer to 
Islamic State’s online community.117 By engaging in xenophobic policy and heightening 
Americans’ fears of Islam, the U.S. will only continue to feed into the vicious cycle of 
fear and contempt that extremist groups so vitally depend on for their continued 
existence. 
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